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Abstract:  
Given curiosity’s fundamental role in motivation, learning, and well-being, we sought to refine 
the measurement of trait curiosity with an improved version of the Curiosity and Exploration 
Inventory (CEI; [Kashdan, T. B., Rose, P., & Fincham, F. D. (2004). Curiosity and exploration: 
Facilitating positive subjective experiences and personal growth opportunities. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 82, 291–305]). A preliminary pool of 36 items was administered to 311 
undergraduate students, who also completed measures of emotion, emotion regulation, 
personality, and well-being. Factor analyses indicated a two-factor model—motivation to seek 
out knowledge and new experiences (Stretching; five items) and a willingness to embrace the 
novel, uncertain, and unpredictable nature of everyday life (Embracing; five items). In two 
additional samples (ns = 150 and 119), we cross-validated this factor structure and provided 
initial evidence for construct validity. This includes positive correlations with personal growth, 
openness to experience, autonomy, purpose in life, self-acceptance, psychological flexibility, 
positive affect, and positive social relations, among others. Applying item response theory (IRT) 
to these samples (n = 578), we showed that the items have good discrimination and a desirable 
breadth of difficulty. The item information functions and test information function were centered 
near zero, indicating that the scale assesses the mid-range of the latent curiosity trait most 
reliably. The findings thus far provide good evidence for the psychometric properties of the 10-
item CEI-II. 
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1. Introduction 
Curiosity is a powerful facet of human motivation ([Berlyne, 1960], [Berlyne, 1971] and [Izard, 
1977]) and one of the fundamental strengths and personality traits studied by psychologists 
([Peterson and Seligman, 2004] and [Reiss, 2000]). Out of 24 fundamental strengths studied by 
psychologists, curiosity was the most commonly endorsed by 12,439 adults in the United States 
and 445 adults in Switzerland (Peterson, Ruch, Beermann, Park, & Seligman, 2007). Sylvan 
Tomkins (1962), a seminal researcher of positive emotions, believed curiosity had benefits of 
profound evolutionary significance: ―The importance of curiosity to thought and memory are so 
extensive that the absence…would jeopardize intellectual development no less than the 
destruction of brain tissue…there is no human competence which can be achieved in the absence 
of a sustaining interest‖ (p. 347).  
 
Despite being interesting to researchers since psychology became a discipline ([Dewey, 1913] 
and [James, 1890]), the study of curiosity has been plagued by inconsistent terminology, 
operational definitions, and measurement strategies. For instance, intrinsic motivation is often 
defined in ways that are identical to curiosity: ―Perhaps no single phenomenon reflects the 
positive potential of human nature as much as intrinsic motivation, the inherent tendency to seek 
out novelty and challenges, to extend and exercise one’s capacities, to explore, and to learn‖ 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 70). 
 
In a similar vein, the concept of flow, being fully immersed in an activity that is challenging, 
enjoyable, and requires the full deployment of one’s skills (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), has been 
described as an extreme variant of curiosity (Fredrickson, 1998). Other terms that are used 
interchangeably with curiosity include interest, novelty-seeking, and openness to experience, 
among others. Unfortunately, few scientists have connected these often isolated bodies of 
research. More precise definitions and terms can aid this endeavor. 
 
As noted above, curiosity bears a resemblance to several other psychological constructs, all of 
which are concerned with the way people regulate and direct their attention in the presence of 
novel or valued environmental stimuli. Although these terms have been used somewhat 
interchangeably, this unfortunate tendency has obscured the fact that the essential qualities of 
curiosity connote a high degree of receptivity and willingness to engage with novel stimuli. 
Curiosity has overlapping attributes with intrinsic motivation, flow, and other variables, but the 
unique characteristics that have emerged across research projects inform the definition we 
propose. These include being interested in new things and possessing an open and receptive 
attitude toward whatever is the target of attention (Bishop et al., 2004). When people feel 
curious, they devote more attention to an activity, process information more deeply, remember 
information better, and are more likely to persist on tasks until goals are met (Silvia, 2006). The 
immediate function of curiosity is to learn, explore, and immerse oneself in the activity that 
initially stimulated the deployment of attentional resources (Loewenstein, 1994). 
 
Implicit in this understanding of curiosity is that people must feel they have the ability to 
effectively cope with or make sense of the novelty, ambiguity and uncertainty being confronted 
during explorations ([Berg and Sternberg, 1985] and [Silvia, 2008]; Spielberger and Starr, 1994 
C.D. Spielberger and L.M. Starr, Curiosity and exploratory behavior. In: H.F. O’Neil and M. 
Drillings, Editors, Motivation: Theory and research, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ (1994), 
pp. 221–243.Spielberger & Starr, 1994). This confidence might vary from situation to situation, 
but across situations, it seems likely to be expressed as the willingness to embrace the novel, 
uncertain, and unpredictable nature of everyday life. Part of this is about embracing, instead of 
fearing and avoiding, uncertainty. Across the lifespan, curiosity serves a broader function of 
building knowledge, skills, relationships, and expertise (Izard, 1977). After all, a person 
spending time with novel stimuli is exposed to some degree of information and experience that 
was not previously available. Thus, another feature of curiosity is the willingness, and perhaps 
desire, to continually accumulate new abilities and experiences. Curiosity captures people’s 
propensity to stretch their capabilities. We propose that curiosity be defined as recognizing, 
embracing, and seeking out knowledge and new experiences. 
 
Research on the benefits of curiosity is only beginning to accumulate. Among other adaptive 
outcomes, curiosity is suspected to play a role in the development of intelligence, wisdom, 
happiness, meaning in life, distress tolerance, and satisfying and engaging social relationships 
(for reviews, see [Kashdan, 2009], [Renninger et al., 1992] and [Silvia, 2006]). Curiosity may 
also be relevant to the development of psychopathology because an intolerance of uncertainty 
has been demonstrated to be an important risk factor for anxiety disorders (Dugas, Freeston, & 
Ladouceur, 1997). 
 
2. Measuring trait curiosity 
Studying trait-like curiosity requires trustworthy tools for measuring curiosity, but the history of 
curiosity assessment is checkered at best ([Boyle, 1983], [Litman and Silvia, 2006] and [Silvia, 
2006], chap. 4). Broadly speaking, measures of trait curiosity use either general self-report 
statements (e.g., ―I am curious about things‖; Naylor, 1981) or lists of specific activities (e.g., 
―Finding out how a carburetor on a car works‖; Pearson, 1970; ―Walking into an old deserted 
house at midnight‖; [Ainley, 1987] and [Ainley, 1998]). Activity-based scales are likely 
confounded by high item-specific error. For example, items about wanting to touch new kinds of 
fabric or to watch films about otters carry a lot of curiosity-irrelevant baggage. Moreover, it 
seems difficult to representatively sample activities from the universe of possible activities that 
people could do. 
 
One recently developed scale to measure curiosity is the seven-item, two-dimensional Curiosity 
and Exploration Inventory (CEI; Kashdan et al., 2004). The first subscale, exploration (four 
items), reflects an orientation toward seeking novel and challenging objects, events, and ideas 
with the aim of integrating these experiences and information. As such, exploration serves as a 
prerequisite to personal growth. The second subscale, absorption (three items), reflects the 
ability to self-regulate attention to allow for immersion in these novel and challenging activities. 
With the aim of creating a general use scale that could be modified as needed for particular 
domains of interest, specific activities and topics were not given undue weight over others. 
Previous studies indicated that the CEI was relatively unaffected by the social desirability issues 
that arise whenever a positive quality is being measured (Kashdan et al., 2004). Evidence for 
construct validity has been shown in daily diary (e.g., Kashdan & Steger, 2007), laboratory (e.g., 
[Silvia, 2005] and [Silvia, 2008]), and cross-sectional studies (e.g., Gallagher & Lopez, 2007) in 
various populations. 
 
Despite these advances, a few limitations warranted refinements in this measurement strategy. 
The absorption scale usually underperformed. Its internal consistency was weak, and its 
correlations with other variables were generally lower than the exploration subscale’s 
correlations ([Gallagher and Lopez, 2007] and [Kashdan et al., 2004]). One reason for the 
absorption scale’s weakness was one reverse-scored item that contained a periphrastic negative 
(―I am not the kind of person who probes deeply into new situations or things‖). Books on 
English usage advise against periphrastic negatives because many readers fail to process the not 
in such phrases (e.g., Garner, 2000). Missing the negative could explain the poor performance of 
this item and the short absorption subscale. Other work shows that removing reverse-scored 
items often improves the psychometric properties of scales. This is because reverse-scored items 
often fail to measure the construct of interest, loading onto a distinct factor from directly worded 
items (e.g., [Rodebaugh et al., 2007] and [Williams et al., 2002]). Essentially, our attempt to 
reduce social desirability effects by including a reverse-scored item ended up introducing other 
unintended problems. Another reason for the scale’s weak score validity is the challenge of 
writing items to capture the unselfconscious state of flow-like absorption (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1990). 
 
Given the increasing popularity of the CEI, it seemed worthwhile to revise the scale. In an 
attempt to create a brief, psychometrically sound measure of curiosity, the authors failed to 
capture the breadth of the construct. The existing literature on curiosity is replete with various 
multi-dimensional models of curiosity that required consideration. Several early theorists 
([Berlyne, 1960] and [Day, 1971]) draw a distinction between the interlocking components of 
specific and diversive curiosity. Specific curiosity refers to an open and receptive attitude and 
willingness to explore events that are ambiguous, strange, unusual, or uncertain. As a 
behaviorist, Berlyne wrote of the importance of these ―collative qualities‖ of a stimulus to induce 
curiosity. With the advancement of cognitive science, it is now understood that subjective 
appraisals of novelty and complexity are more important than ―objective‖ stimulus features 
(Silvia, 2006). Often, specific curiosity and motivated actions originate with a mixture of 
pleasant and unpleasant feelings ([Berlyne, 1967] and [Leherissey, 1971]). This is not surprising 
because novel and uncertain events often elicit a conflict between the desire to escape anxiety 
and the desire to act on curious feelings (Spielberger & Starr, 1994). Highly curious people are 
theorized to more readily tolerate anxiety and continue in the direction of desired explorations.  
 
Diversive curiosity refers to a more general desire to seek out new experiences and information, 
with exploration leading to some degree of insight of the previously unknown. Diversive 
curiosity originates when someone feels a readiness to grow and expand as opposed to remaining 
in familiar, certain territory. Although he relied on the term intrinsic motivation instead of 
curiosity, a similar model was proposed by Deci (1975), who suggested that one facet refers to 
seeking new stimulation (mirroring diversive curiosity) and the other involves confronting 
challenges and working with ambiguity and uncertainty (mirroring specific curiosity). 
 
Other divisions of curiosity focus on the sources that arouse interest and motivate exploratory 
behavior. For instance, distinctions have been made between epistemic curiosity (desire for 
intellectual information or facts), perceptual curiosity (desire to acquire experiences through the 
senses), and variants of sensation seeking (preference for thrilling, adventurous, and dangerous 
experiences where great risks are willing to be incurred for the sake of varied experiences) 
(Berlyne, 1960; Zuckerman, 1994). Several instruments were created to measure these facets of 
curiosity (e.g., [Ainley, 1986], [Collins et al., 2004] and [Litman and Spielberger, 2003]). 
However, we believe that attempting to understand and measure the nature of curiosity is a 
different aim than focusing on the variety of curiosity inducers spanning objects, people, 
memories, fantasy, and ideas. 
 
In the original CEI, the authors captured the specific curiosity and exploration dimension, as well 
as the centrality of being able to self-regulate attention to find new experiences and sustain 
engagement. The self-regulation of attention has been advocated as a necessary antecedent to 
actively acting on curious feelings (Bishop et al., 2004). However, the authors of the CEI failed 
to address individual differences in the willingness to manage (even embrace) the tension that 
often arises when confronting novelty and uncertainty. We wanted to capture this facet of 
curiosity that is central to several theoretical models but often ignored in measurement attempts 
([Berlyne, 1960], [Beswick, 1971], [Day, 1971] and [Deci, 1975]). Whether a person is intrigued 
by new information or sensations ([Fredrickson, 1998] and [Izard, 1977]) or aiming to resolve a 
perceived gap in knowledge ([Beswick, 1971] and [Loewenstein, 1994]), most theorists agree 
that being curious entails reacting to events with open, non-defensive attitudes. This includes 
tolerance for ambiguity, distress, and uncertainty, and viewing difficulties as challenges more 
often than threats. 
 
3. The present research 
The major goal of the present research was to improve the initial version of the CEI to create a 
brief, reliable, valid measure of curiosity that expands the breadth of the construct. One central 
facet that is widely discussed in theoretical models of curiosity, and addressed in prior 
instruments, is exploration or stretching. This might be defined as actively seeking opportunities 
for new information and experiences (e.g., [Ainley, 1987], [Berlyne, 1960] and [Pearson, 1970]). 
A second central facet of curiosity is the willingness to embrace the novel, uncertain, and 
unpredictable nature of everyday life ([Berg and Sternberg, 1985], [Beswick, 1971], [Day, 1971] 
and [Silvia, 2008]). Although tolerance of uncertainty has been considered in conceptual models 
of curiosity, this element has been consistently ignored in prior measurement attempts. Efforts 
were made to represent these two fundamental facets of curiosity in the new measure. 
 
To meet our aims, we conducted factor analyses with multiple samples. To address convergent 
and discriminant validity, we examined relations with other measures of affective styles, emotion 
regulation, and personality. Measures of well-being were included to extend recent research 
showing that curiosity contributes to greater emotional, psychological, and social well-being. 
Finally, we conducted item response theory analysis (IRT) to move beyond classic test theory to 
better understand the quality of the items and information provided by our curiosity scale. In 
particular, for a socially desirable construct, it can be useful to understand whether our attempt to 
measure curiosity captures the full continuum of scorers or is circumscribed to extremely high 
and low scorers. 
 
4. Study 1 
4.1. Participants 
To establish the initial validity of the CEI-II, we used a sample of 311 undergraduates (247 
female) from a large, public, Mid-Atlantic university. The majority of the sample identified 
themselves as ―Caucasian‖ (56.2%), while the rest were ―Asian‖ (16.4%), ―African American‖ 
(9.2%), ―Hispanic‖ (7.9%), and ―other‖ (10.3%). Participants were at least 18 years old with a 
mean age of 22.02 (SD = 5.23). 
 
4.2. Item generation 
A preliminary pool of 36 items was generated by the first two authors. This pool of items 
contained revised versions of many of the items of the original CEI (Kashdan et al., 2004) and 
was generated based on the a priori hypothesis that there may be three facets of curiosity: 
exploring or stretching, absorption, and embracing uncertainty. At least ten potential items were 
constructed to measure each of the three hypothesized factors, and the order of these items was 
randomized. 
 
One problem of the CEI was that absorption items loaded together into a separate factor but 
served minimal utility on their own; in fact, they appeared to suppress the validity of the total 
score. Thus, our decision to remove absorption from the final CEI-II item pool was an iterative 
process. First, we determined whether an absorption factor would be found in factor analyses. 
Second, we evaluated the validity of these items. In each of the studies in this paper, we found 
support for an absorption factor characterized by the ability to self-regulate attention toward 
activities and be immersed and engaged. However, these items failed to show correlations 
greater than |.13| with 26 out of 30 outcome variables. The removal of these items improved the 
reliability and validity of the CEI-II total score. We believe that absorption is difficult to measure 
with a global self-report instrument that does not take context into consideration. Moreover, 
tendencies to be absorbed are implicit in the stretching and embracing facets of curiosity. For 
these reasons, our final item pool excluded absorption items. We believe this is one of many 




Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., submitted for publication). The 
AAQ-II is a 10-item measure assessing individual differences in the ability to flexibly respond to 
emotions as the situation demands without needless defense and avoidance. This scale has 
adequate psychometric properties (α = .89; for data on original scale, see Hayes et al., 2004). 
 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003). This scale consists of four items 
assessing the reliance on suppressing emotions (α = .85) and six items assessing cognitive 
reappraisal as regulatory strategies (α = .71). The scale shows good psychometric properties 
(Gross & John, 2003). 
 
Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ; Gross & John, 1995). We used the 16-item Berkeley 
Expressivity Questionnaire to assess tendencies to express negative emotions (α = .67) and 
positive emotions (α = .70), respectively, and impulsive tendencies to express emotions as they 
first appear (α = .74). The measure shows adequate psychometric properties (Gross & John, 
1997). 
 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS: Gratz & Roemer, 2004). This contains 36 items 
to assess six self-regulatory problems: unwillingness to accept emotions that arise (accept; 
α = .87), difficulties engaging in goal-directed behavior (goals; α = .89), impulse control 
problems when upset (impulse; α = .88), inadequate attention to emotions (aware; α = .78), 
limited access to effective emotion regulation strategies (strategies; α = .88), and difficulty 
identifying and communicating feelings (clarity; α = .79). The scale shows adequate reliability 
and validity ([Gratz and Roemer, 2004] and [Gratz et al., 2006]). 
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Factor analysis 
We began by conducting an exploratory factor analysis (EFA). This analysis was conducted in 
SPSS using maximum-likelihood estimation with promax rotation. The oblique rotation method 
was chosen because we hypothesized that the factors would be correlated facets of the higher-
order latent construct of curiosity. The results of the scree plot indicated the presence of two-
factors (eigenvalues of 3.99 and 1.40) that were clearly interpretable as the stretching and 
embracing facets of curiosity. Based on this initial EFA, we selected the best 10 of the original 
36 items. These 10 items were selected by identifying the five best items for both factors based 
on high loadings on the designated factors and low cross-loadings on the other factor. This 
revised, 10-item version of the Curiosity and Exploration Inventory (CEI-II) can be found in 
Appendix A. After finding preliminary support for this two-factor, 10-item CEI-II, we conducted 
a series of analyses to explore the psychometrics and construct validity of the revised measure. 
 
4.4.2. Psychometrics 
Means, standard deviations, alpha reliability coefficients, and correlations between the CEI-II 
and other constructs are reported in Table 1. The CEI-II has acceptable internal reliability. As 
might be expected, one of the strongest positive relations with the CEI-II was psychological 
flexibility (r = .29). This makes sense as flexibility is defined as the ability to be aware in the 
present moment and fully in contact with thoughts and feelings without needless defense, and, 
depending upon what the situation affords, persisting or changing behavior in the pursuit of 
valued aims (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). Being curious is considered one of 
the ingredients for living flexibly and discovering interests and values that aid in decision-
making and resource allocation (Bishop et al., 2004). In the same vein, curiosity has expected 
positive relations with effective reappraisal skills (or regulating emotions by viewing events from 
different perspectives) (r = .35), the willingness to openly express positive emotions (r = .22), 
and the ability to persist at goal-directed behavior (low scores reflect greater persistence) 
(r = −.23) and access multiple routes to goals (low scores reflect greater access) (r = −.25) even 
when distressed. Together, these findings converge to illustrate the awareness, openness, 
flexibility, and distress tolerance of people scoring higher on the CEI-II. 
 
Table 1.  
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the CEI-II in Study 1. 
 
CEI-II-total CEI-II-stretching CEI-II-embracing 
Mean (SD) 32.94 (6.65) 17.51 (3.69) 15.43 (4.01) 
α .83 .79 .76 
AAQ-II 
Flexibility .29  .26  .19  
ERQ 
Suppression −.06 −.09 .02 
 
CEI-II-total CEI-II-stretching CEI-II-embracing 
Reappraisal .35  .31  .28  
BEQ 
Negative expressivity −.10 −.06 −.12  
Positive expressivity .22  .24  .13  
Impulse strength −.08 −.06 −.05 
DERS 
Total −.21  −.22  −.10 
Clarity −.10 −.15 .02 
Aware −.20  −.22  −.09 
Impulse −.15  −.14  −.08 
Accept .08 −.07 −.03 
Goals −.23  −.23  −.13  
Strategies −.25  −.23  −.16  
AAQ-II: Acceptance and Action Questionnaire; ERQ: Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; BEQ: 
Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire and DERS: Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale. 
 p < .05. 
 p < .001.  
 
5. Study 2 
5.1. Participants 
To provide further evidence of the validity of the CEI-II, we evaluated confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) models in a second sample of undergraduates from a large Midwestern 
University. This sample consisted of 150 undergraduates (99 females) with an average age of 
19.53 (SD = 2.73) who participated in exchange for psychology course credit. The majority of 
the sample identified themselves as ―Caucasian‖ (80.7%), while the rest were ―Asian‖ (10%), 
―African American‖ (1.3%), ―Hispanic‖ (2.7%), and ―other‖ (5.3%). These participants 
completed the 10-item CEI-II as a part of a larger battery of questionnaires. 
 
5.2. Measures 
5.2.1. Emotional and psychological well-being 
The trait version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) was used to assess general positive affect (10 items) and negative affect (10 
items). Life satisfaction was assessed using the four-item Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS; 
Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). In this sample, alphas ranged from .87 to .92. A 42-item version 
of Ryff’s Psychological Well-Being Scale (1989) assessed six additional elements of well-being: 
autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations with others, purpose in 
life and self-acceptance. Each factor was assessed with seven-items (α’s from .73 to .86). 
 
5.2.2. Social well-being 
Using scales developed by Keyes (1998), we measured five elements of social well-being: social 
integration, social acceptance, social contribution, social actualization, and social coherence. 
Each scale contains six or seven items (α’s from .70 to .86). 
 
5.2.3. Emotional distress 
The 21-item version of the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995) was used as a global measure of psychological distress. The DASS contains 
three seven item scales with the intent of providing ―pure‖ measures of anxiety, depression, and 
general distress (α’s from .81 to .87). 
 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Factor analysis 
We used CFA to validate the two-factor latent structure of curiosity identified in Study 1. CFA 
models were analyzed using LISREL 8.8 and maximum-likelihood estimation. The covariance 
matrix was used for all models, and constructs were identified by fixing the variances to 1. 
Models were evaluated for goodness of fit using several common fit indices: the root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger & Lind, 1980), the standardized root mean 
residual (SRMR; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996), the non-normed fit index (NNFI; Bentler & Bonett, 
1980), and the comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990). Current guidelines regarding model fit 
indices ([Brown, 2006], [Hu and Bentler, 1999] and [Kline, 2004]) suggest that CFA/NNFI 
values .95, and RMSEA/SRMR values .08 indicate good model fit. However, each of these 
fit indices suffers from different biases and it is therefore important to collectively evaluate the 
results of the various fit indices. We began by examining the support for the two-factor latent 
structure identified in the first sample using the final 10-item scale. This model demonstrated 
good fit (χ
2
 (34, n = 150) = 64.62, p < .01; NNFI = .96; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .08; SRMR = .06) 
according to each of the fit indices. The standardized results of this model can be seen in Fig. 1. 





Fig. 1. Completely standardized solution of the two-factor model of curiosity in the second 
student sample. Model fit: χ
2
 (34, n = 150) = 64.62, p < .01; NNFI = .96; CFI = .97; 
RMSEA = .08 and SRMR = .06. 
 
5.3.2. Psychometrics 
Means, standard deviations, alpha reliability coefficients, and correlations between the CEI-II 
and other constructs are reported in Table 2. The CEI-II has acceptable internal reliability 
(α = .86). The strongest correlation was with the Personal Growth subscale (r = .49), which has 
the greatest content overlap with the notion of curiosity motivating people to explore, discover, 
and expand their knowledge and experiences (Izard, 1977). Consistent with prior work, people 
scoring higher on the CEI-II report greater meaning and purpose in life (r = .38) (Kashdan & 
Steger, 2007), positive affect and general happiness (rs = .28 and .32) ([Gallagher and Lopez, 
2007] and [Kashdan et al., 2004]), a satisfied need to belong (as operationalized by positive 
relations with others and social actualization; rs = .33 and .23) and a sense of social value as a 
member of society (i.e., social contribution; r = .34) (e.g., [Kashdan and Silvia, 2009] and 
[McCrae, 1996]). Also, small inverse relations exist between curiosity and emotional 
disturbances such as depressive symptoms (r = −.26) and anxiety (r = −.17). These small 
relations are not surprising as an open and receptive attitude to novelty and uncertainty implies a 
certain comfort level with a rich emotional life, including sadness and tension (this distress 
tolerance emerged in the pattern of correlations in Study 1). 
 
Table 2.  
Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations for the CEI-II in Study 2. 
 
CEI-II-total CEI-II-stretching CEI-II-embracing 
Mean (SD) 33.22 (6.78) 17.98 (3.63) 15.24 (3.97) 
α .86 .80 .79 
Positive affect .28  .38  .20  
Negative affect −.05 −.10 −.04 
General happiness .32  .35  .34  
Psychological Well-Being Scale 
Autonomy .35  .40  .23  
Environmental mastery .15 .27  .01 
Personal growth .49  .54  .34  
Positive relations .33  .37  .22  
Purpose in life .38  .45  .24  
Self acceptance .39  .47  .24  
 
CEI-II-total CEI-II-stretching CEI-II-embracing 
Social Well-Being 
Social acceptance .07 .06 .07 
Social actualization .23  .24  .18  
Social coherence .10 .19  .00 
Social contribution .34  .42  .20  
Social integration .23  .30  .11 
Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales 
General distress −.06 −.08 −.02 
Anxiety −.17  −.18  −.12 
Depression −.26  −.32  −.16 
 p < .05. 
 p < .001.  
 
 
6. Study 3 
6.1. Participants 
To further examine the factor structure and validity of the CEI-II, we studied a third sample of 
undergraduates from a Mid-Atlantic University. This sample consisted of 119 undergraduates 
(95 females) with an average age of 19.81 (SD = 3.25) who participated in exchange for 
psychology course credit. The majority of the sample identified themselves as ―Caucasian‖ 
(61%), while the rest were ―Asian‖ (17.8%), ―African American‖ (11%), ―Hispanic‖ (4.2%), and 





The 15-item Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) assessed trait 
mindfulness. In particular, the items capture awareness in the present moment—the ability to 
observe and attend to thoughts, feelings, and sensations as they fluctuate over time (α = .87). 
Lower scores reflect greater mindfulness. 
 
6.2.2. Big Five personality traits 
The 60-item NEO-PI (Costa & McCrae, 1992) assessed trait openness to experience (α = .70), 
conscientiousness (α = .86), extraversion (α = .79), agreeableness (α = .75), and neuroticism 
(α = .63). 
 
6.2.3. Political views 
Using a four item face-valid measure, we assessed the degree to which people adopted 
conservative political views. On a scale from 1 = very liberal to 7 = very conservative, people 
rated their views on foreign policy, economic, and social issues. They also rated themselves on a 
continuum from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. We used an aggregate of these 
items (α = .86). 
 
6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Factor analysis 
We began by examining the support for the two-factor latent structure identified in the first two 
samples. This model demonstrated good fit according to most of the fit indices (χ
2
 (34, 
n = 117) = 60.48, p < .01; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .08; SRMR = .06), but only marginal fit 
according to one fit index (NNFI = .93). The completely standardized results of this model can 





Fig. 2. Completely standardized solution of the two-factor model of curiosity in the third student 
sample. Model fit: χ
2
 (34, n = 117) = 60.48, p < .01; NNFI = .93; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .08, and 
SRMR = .06. 
 
6.3.2. Psychometrics 
Means, standard deviations, alpha reliability coefficients, and correlations between the CEI-II 
and other constructs are reported in Table 3. Once again, results indicated that the CEI-II has 
acceptable internal reliability (α = .85). As might be expected due to their conceptual overlap, the 
strongest correlation with the CEI-II was openness to experience (r = .51). In the Big Five 
theoretical framework, curiosity is considered a lower-order, central facet of openness to 
experience (John & Srivastava, 1999). Also, curiosity had a large positive correlation with 
extraversion (r = .42), often considered to be a reflection of positive affectivity and reward 
sensitivity (as opposed to sociability; Lucas et al., 2000 R.E. Lucas, E. Diener, A. Grob, E.M. 
Suh and L. Shao, Cross-cultural evidence for the fundamental features of extraversion, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 79 (2000), pp. 452–468. Abstract | Order Document | Full 
Text via CrossRef | View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (119)[Lucas et al., 2000] and 
[Watson and Clark, 1997]). This fits with research defining curiosity as a discrete positive affect 
([Fredrickson, 1998] and [Izard, 1977]). As another demonstration of links with psychological 
flexibility, curiosity was associated with more liberal political values (r = −.26). Finally, of the 
three studies, the strongest correlate of the embracing subscale of the CEI-II was mindful 
awareness (low scores reflect greater mindful awareness) (r = −.22). This is not surprising as the 
item content of the embracing subscale reflect an open and receptive attitude when confronted 
with uncertain, unfamiliar, ambiguous, or novel stimuli. Regardless of ongoing unpleasant 
feelings, people scoring high in embracing should be more aware in the present moment and 
effective at managing their behavior. The link with mindfulness provides validity for this 
dimension of curiosity. 
 
Table 3.  
Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations for the CEI-II in Study 3. 
 
CEI-II-total CEI-II-stretching CEI-II-embracing 
Mean (SD) 32.90 (7.48) 17.08 (3.88) 15.82 (4.37) 
α .85 .78 .75 
Big Five 
Openness to experience .51  .50  .43  
Conscientiousness .20  .31  .07 
Extraversion .42  .29  .46  
Agreeableness −.04 .03 −.09 
Neuroticism −.27  −.30  −.20  
Mindfulness −.14 −.02 −.22  
Conservative political views −.26  −.28  −.19  
Lower scores reflect greater mindfulness. 
 p < .05. 
 p < .001.  
 
7. Study 4: an item response theory analysis 
The CEI-II deserves close psychometric scrutiny, given the limitations of the first scale and the 
goal to create a brief instrument. In this study, we appraised the scale’s psychometric features 
using IRT. Among its other advantages, IRT makes realistic assumptions about measurement 
error. Classical test theory (CTT) assumes that measurement error is constant across levels of the 
personality trait—all levels are supposedly measured equally well, so all participants are 
presumably measured with the same amount of error. Few researchers would actually agree that 
this is true in practice. Most researchers, for example, would suspect that extreme scores on 
personality scales contain more measurement error than less extreme scores. 
 
IRT, in contrast, assumes that some levels of the trait are measured with less error than other 
levels. More importantly, IRT allows researchers to estimate which trait regions are measured 
more effectively, thereby illuminating the scale’s psychometric behavior. For example, some 
scales ought to have the most reliable scores—the most test information, in IRT—at the high end 
of the trait. Criterion-referenced scales, for example, ought to have the most information at the 
cut-off point because researchers using the scale primarily want to discriminate between people 
above or below the cut-off. For norm-referenced scales measuring factors of normal personality, 
such as the CEI-II, researchers would want the scale to measure the trait’s middle most reliably, 
given that the full range of scores is of interest to individual-differences researchers. 
 
In CTT, samples and items are confounded. Estimates of people’s trait levels depend on features 
of the items, and estimates of the item’s features depend on features of the sample. IRT, in 
contrast, estimates people’s trait levels independently of the items and the item’s properties 
independently of the sample. For this reason, the trait scores generated by IRT are presumed to 
be robust—theoretically, they ought to be independent of the items used to assess the trait. 
Likewise, the item parameters provided by an IRT analysis ought to be independent of the 
specific people who responded to the items. As a result, IRT can allay common concerns over a 
sample’s representativeness. 
 
IRT is valuable to personality assessment in general, and it offers unique insight into the CEI-II. 
For one, IRT can provide information about which range of the trait is assessed most accurately. 
Information about a scale’s information maximum (i.e., the trait level with the lowest 
measurement error) is useful to researchers who plan to use the scale. Furthermore, the scale’s 
IRT parameters—item discrimination and item difficulty—should be robust across samples, so 




Given the large sample-size requirements of IRT methods, we combined the samples reported in 
Studies 1–3 to form a sample of 578 people (76% female). There was very little missing data: the 
covariance coverage (proportion of complete cases per matrix cell) ranged from 99.5% to 100%. 
 
7.1.2. Statistical model and IRT estimates 
The data were analyzed using a two-parameter logistic (2PL) graded-response model (Samejima, 
1997), which is a polytomous generalization of a common 2PL model for binary data 
([Embretson and Reise, 2000] and [Ostini and Nering, 2006]). The models were estimated with 
full-information maximum-likelihood with robust standard errors. All analyses were conducted 
using Mplus 5.2. 
 
For our IRT analysis, we were interested in three estimates. First, IRT provides estimates of each 
item’s discrimination (the a-parameter), which reflects how quickly the probability of endorsing 
an item changes as a function of changes in the underlying latent trait. The strength of an item’s 
discrimination value is conceptually akin to the strength of an item’s factor loading in a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA): highly-discriminating items more strongly reflect the latent 
trait. (A two-parameter IRT model is in fact a kind of CFA model; [Brown, 2006] and [Skrondal 
and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004].) 
 
Second, IRT provides estimates of each item’s difficulty (the b-parameter). In IRT, an item’s 
difficulty is expressed in relation to the underlying trait. If only people high in the trait endorse 
an item, then the item is difficult; if people low in the trait endorse the item, then the item is 
easy. In personality assessment, easy items tend to get high scores from nearly everyone. The 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, for example, is an ―easy scale‖ because most people have very 
high scores (Gray-Little, Williams, & Hancock, 1997). In traditional norm-referenced testing, 
researchers desire a scale’s items to be moderately difficult (i.e., means around the midpoint) 
because, all else equal, the scale’s internal consistency will be higher. There is no necessary 
reason, however, for each item to be similarly difficult. In fact, researchers who wish to provide 
information about a broad range of a trait ought to include items that vary in difficulty. 
 
Finally, IRT provides estimates of the scale’s total information function, which depicts the 
amount of information the scale provides across levels of the latent trait. Classical test methods 
have no analog to IRT’s test information and standard error functions because they presume that 
all trait levels are measured equally well. 
 
7.2. Results 
To simplify the analyses and presentation, we estimated an IRT model for the total scale score 
(i.e., overall curiosity) rather than separate models for the subscales. These findings thus describe 
the properties of the global curiosity variable that subsumes the two highly-correlated facets. 
According to a categorical factor analysis (i.e., one that treats the items as ordinal, polytomous 
variables and uses polychoric correlations) of the 10 items, the data satisfy the IRT assumptions 
regarding local independence and construct dimensionality. 
 
Table 4 lists the CEI-II’s items and the percentage of the sample that gave a particular response 
to each item. There were no empty cells—all of the options were selected at least once—but 
some items received few 1s. The modal response was a 3 or 4. 
 
Table 4.  
Descriptive statistics, percent responses by scale value, and IRT discrimination values (a) and 
difficulty thresholds (b). 











a b1 b2 b3 b4 
1. I actively seek as 
much information as I 
can in new situations 
3.69 1.9 8.8 27.3 42.4 19.6 .57 −4.23 −2.36 −.55 1.65 
2. I am the type of 
person who really 
enjoys the uncertainty 
of everyday life 
3.15 9.2 19.1 30.5 30.2 11.1 .60 −2.47 −1.07 .35 2.27 
3. I am at my best when 
doing something that is 
complex or challenging 
3.51 4.7 9.9 32.6 35.6 17.2 .71 −2.84 −1.72 −.13 1.55 











a b1 b2 b3 b4 
4. Everywhere I go, I 
am out looking for new 
things or experiences 
3.31 6.2 15.3 33.8 30.5 14.2 1.02 −2.09 −1.08 .14 1.45 
5. I view challenging 
situations as an 
opportunity to grow and 
learn 
3.59 2.8 11.6 28.5 37.2 19.9 1.08 −2.56 −1.35 −.23 1.08 
6. I like to do things 
that are a little 
frightening 
2.87 15.6 24.4 27.6 22.5 9.9 .57 −1.93 −.52 .79 2.50 
7. I am always looking 
for experiences that 
challenge how I think 
about myself and the 
world 
3.36 3.5 17 35.1 28.7 15.7 1.06 −2.44 −1.09 .16 1.34 
8. I prefer jobs that are 
excitingly unpredictable 
3.03 10.1 22.4 32.8 24.4 10.4 .69 −2.16 −.78 .59 2.16 
9. I frequently seek out 
opportunities to 
challenge myself and 
grow as a person 
3.16 5.2 21.3 37.3 24.4 11.8 .97 −2.28 −.88 .44 1.67 
10. I am the kind of 
person who embraces 
unfamiliar people, 
events, and places 
3.32 6.6 16.3 31.7 28.9 16.5 .89 −2.16 −1.06 .11 1.39 
Note: The percentages represent the percent of the sample that selected a given response option. 
Items 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 are the stretching facet; items 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 are the embracing facet. 
Items are anchored on the following scale: 1= very slightly or not at all; 2 = a little; 3 = 
moderately; 4 = quite a bit; 5 = extremely. 
 
7.2.1. Discrimination values 
Table 4 reports the item’s discrimination values (a values). In IRT, these values can range from 0 
to around 3. They represent how quickly an item’s scores change as a function of changes in the 
latent trait. Like factor loadings in a CFA, they capture how closely an item represents the latent 
trait being measured. 
 
On the whole, the discrimination values are good, although some are higher than others. Based 
on Baker’s (1985) guidelines, five items have moderate discrimination (1, 2, 3, 6, and 8), two 
items have high discrimination (9 and 10), and three items have very high discrimination (4, 5, 
and 7). For self-report measures of individual differences, it is not necessarily desirable to have 
only items with very high discrimination. Such items provide a great deal of information for only 
a narrow range of the trait. 
 
To get a sense of what the discrimination values mean, we can view the category response curves 
(CRC), which display how the score probabilities vary as a function of the latent curiosity trait. 
For the sake of illustration, Fig. 3 presents the CRCs for items 5 and 6, which differ in their 
discrimination values. The CRCs depict the probability that someone will respond to the item 
with a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. The probability level is along the Y-axis; the level of trait curiosity, 




Fig. 3. Category response curves for Items 5 and 6. 
 
The CRCs depict the predictions that the IRT model makes about how people who vary in 
curiosity ought to respond. For item 6, for example, someone with a trait level of −2 (two SD 
below the mean) is most likely to respond with a 1, someone with a trait level of 0 is most likely 
to respond with a 3, and someone with a trait level of two is most likely to respond with a 4. 
The different discrimination values are evident in the peaks and overlaps of the probability 
curves. For item 5, which has a higher discrimination value, the response probabilities have 
higher peaks and have relatively less overlap. Each scale value (1 through 5) has a region where 
its absolute probability is at least 50%, indicating that there are trait levels where that response is 
more probable than the other four options combined. For item 6, in contrast, the response 
probabilities are flatter and overlap more significantly. For the middle three options (2, 3, and 4), 
the response curves are never higher than .50. Hence, item 6 does not discriminate between 
people as well. Stated differently, item 6 does not rank-order people as well or predict their 
responses as precisely as item 5 does. 
 
7.2.2. Difficulty thresholds 
Table 4 reports the item’s difficulty thresholds. Each item has five possible responses, so there 
are four response thresholds, depicted as b1, b2, b3, and b4. In IRT, these thresholds represent the 
trait levels at which someone has a 50% chance of scoring at or above a scale response. 
These thresholds give a good deal of information about each item. For example, we will use the 
thresholds for item 5. The value for b1, the threshold between a response of 1 and a response of 
2, is −2.56. This means that someone with a trait score of −2.56, a pretty low level, has at least a 
50% chance of responding to the item with a 2, 3, 4, or 5. Stated conversely, a response of 1 is 
the most likely response for people with a curiosity level less than −2.56. The value for b2, the 
threshold between the scores of 2 and 3, is −1.35, so people with a curiosity score of −1.35 have 
at least a 50% chance of responding with a 3, 4, or 5. On the whole, these thresholds reveal that 
item 5 is somewhat easy. The last threshold, b4, is 1.08, which is only around 1 SD above the 
mean. This means that everyone with a curiosity level greater than 1.08 has at least a 50% 
chance of responding with a 5, the highest possible scale score. 
 
The difficulty thresholds are related to the frequency with which people chose different response 
options. item 6, for example, has a high b4 threshold, and relatively few people responded with a 
5 to the item. Conversely, item 1 has a low b1 threshold, and relatively few people responded 
with a 1 to the item. 
 
For a self-report scale that measures individual differences, it is desirable for the items to offer 
information about a broad range of the trait. For this reason, some items should be ―easier‖ and 
others should be ―harder.‖ An example of a relatively easy item is item 1: its lowest threshold is 
quite low, and only 1.9% of the sample responded with a 1 to it. Only people who are very low 
in curiosity will respond with low scores to this item. A relatively harder item is item 6: its 
highest threshold is 2.5, so only people who are very high in curiosity will respond with a 5. 
Nevertheless, there is not much between-item variation in the difficulty ranges. Each item covers 
a good range of the trait, but the items as a group tend to be centered at the trait’s midpoint. 
 
7.2.3. Item information and test information 
Information functions depict the range of the trait that an item or scale measures most reliably. 
For polytomous IRT models, an item’s information function nicely captures the item’s difficulty 
and discrimination: difficulty levels affect the function’s position on the X-axis, and 
discrimination levels affect the function’s kurtosis (or peakedness). The information functions 
thus visually summarize the a and b values in Table 4. 
 
Fig. 4 depicts the item information functions for all 10 of the CEI-II items. It is clear from these 
functions that all 10 items capture a similar range of the trait. All 10 curves peak roughly at zero, 
the trait’s midpoint, consistent with the item’s similar difficulty levels. Some curves are more 
leptokurtic than others, consistent with their higher discrimination values, but the differences 
between items are not great. In short, each of the 10 items provides maximal information at 




Fig. 4. Item information functions for the 10 CEI-II items. 
 
Fig. 5 displays the test information function for the CEI-II. This curve depicts the region of the 
trait for which the scale as a whole provides the most information. Stated differently, the trait 
regions with the most information are the trait levels measured with the least error. For the CEI-
II, the information function is centered almost exactly at 0, the midpoint of the latent curiosity 
trait. As a result, the CEI-II is capturing the ―fat middle‖ of curiosity the best, not the trait’s low 
end or the high end. In terms of measurement error, the CEI-II measures people very high and 
very low in curiosity with the most error and people with intermediate scores with the least error. 
For a scale measuring normal individual differences, this is an ideal information function: the 





Fig. 5. Test information function for the CEI-II. 
 
8. General discussion 
The assessment of curiosity has flourished in the past few years. Many new scales have been 
published, but few have been subjected to close psychometric scrutiny. The present research 
centered on the development of a brief, reliable, and valid measure of curiosity, improving upon 
an earlier version of the CEI. The data offers early evidence for the scale’s latent structure and 
evidence for convergent and discriminant validity. This includes empirical support for two 
dimensions of curiosity: being motivated to seek knowledge and new experiences (Stretching; 
five items) and a general willingness to embrace the novel, uncertain, and unpredictable nature of 
everyday life (Embracing; five items). This factor structure was remarkably similar in 
independent samples. The 10-item CEI-II showed the expected correlations with relevant 
measures of psychological flexibility, affect, emotion regulation, and psychological and social 
well-being. Due to the large correlations among the subscales, there is also benefit in using the 
aggregate, total score in future investigations. 
 
These two dimensions, stretching and embracing, converge with the interlocking elements of 
curiosity discussed by various theorists (e.g., [Berlyne, 1960], [Beswick, 1971], [Day, 1971] and 
Deci, 1975 E. Deci, Intrinsic motivation, Plenum, New York (1975).[Deci, 1975]; Spielberger & 
Starr, 1994). Although these theorists discuss the importance of being able to manage the anxiety 
provoking nature of being confronted with novel, complex, or uncertain situations, most 
measures neglect the embracing dimension of curiosity. Without an ability to handle appraised 
novelty–complexity, curiosity and exploration is squelched with avoidance often serving as the 
replacement ([Kashdan, 2007] and [Silvia, 2006]). 
 
Building on prior research with the original CEI and other measures, in three studies, we found 
an expected pattern of correlations with other constructs. The strongest correlations with 
curiosity included openness to experience and personal growth. Being curious is part of a 
sequence where these feelings motivate exploratory behavior that inherently leads to discovery 
and growth (no matter how slight) ([Izard, 1977] and [Panksepp, 1998]). Other positive 
correlations suggest that high scorers on the CEI-II are psychologically flexible, possess 
awareness and clarity of their emotions, report frequent positive emotions and general happiness, 
show a willingness to express positive feelings openly, and are able to persist or modify 
pathways to important goals even when confronted with distressing thoughts and feelings. Also, 
although curiosity is rarely considered in the social world, recent work suggests that being 
curious is integral to creating and maintaining satisfying conversations and intimate relationships 
(e.g., [Burpee and Langer, 2005], [Gable et al., 2004] and [Kashdan and Roberts, 2004]). The 
present series of studies provided further support for the social benefits of being a curious person 
as we found positive associations with satisfying the need to belong, possessing positive relations 
with other people, and feeling valued as a person embedded in larger society. Besides the social 
benefits linked to curiosity, other psychological needs for autonomy and self-acceptance ([Deci 
and Ryan, 2000] and [Ryff, 1989]) were more likely to be satisfied for highly curious people. 
 
Nearly all of these positive correlates were more strongly linked to the stretching dimension of 
curiosity as opposed to the embracing dimension. The outcomes with the strongest unique 
relations to embracing were mindful awareness and extraversion. It is intuitive that people 
embracing uncertainty should show greater self-awareness and a willingness to be open to and 
receptive of both internal and external stimuli across the full range of positive and negative 
valence ([Bishop et al., 2004] and [Brown and Ryan, 2003]). Similarly, it was not surprising that 
this orientation to novelty and uncertainty would be strongly linked to openness to experience, 
personal growth, and general happiness. At first glance, the strong relation between embracing 
and extraversion might be surprising. However, the central feature of extraversion does not 
appear to be sociability, rather it appears to be the ability to extract pleasure and meaning from 
life events (e.g., [Lucas et al., 2008] and [Lucas et al., 2000]) and experience positive emotions 
despite encountering daily hassles and stressors in an uncertain world (Watson & Clark, 1997). 
With this formulation of extraversion, links to the ability to embrace the tension of novelty and 
uncertainty become more understandable. 
 
Beyond classical test methods, we applied more advanced techniques to appraise and describe 
the CEI-II’s psychometric properties. The use of CFA procedures to evaluate the latent structure 
of curiosity across multiple samples provides evidence for the proposed two-factor theory of 
curiosity. Although there was one instance of a fit index indicating only marginal fit, the results 
of the CFA models were almost uniformly supportive of the proposed two-factor model. These 
results suggest that the CEI-II is a valid assessment for researchers interested in exploring the 
effects of curiosity within a latent variable modeling framework. Due to the strong correlation 
between the stretching and embracing facets of curiosity, we advise researchers to consider using 
parceling techniques (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002) to create aggregated 
indicators of curiosity that contain items from both the stretching and embracing subscales. 
Parcels typically demonstrate superior psychometric properties (e.g. higher reliability, reduced 
chance of distributional violations) than individual items and might therefore provide a more 
reliable method of identifying the latent construct of curiosity. 
 
The IRT analyses also yielded several findings that should encourage use of the scale. First, the 
item discriminations were good, although some items were clearly more discriminating than 
others. Discrimination values in this range are typical for self-report measures of attitudes and 
personality used in basic research. Second, the difficulty thresholds and information functions 
revealed that the CEI-II measures the midpoint of the trait most effectively. 
 
These analyses offer some guidance for different uses of the scale. For one, the scale seems well-
suited to basic studies of individual differences. The scale captures the ―fat middle‖ of trait 
curiosity the best, so the scale will be effective for studies of normal between-person variation in 
curiosity. One consequence of the CEI-II’s test information function is that researchers are 
probably better off measuring the full range of curiosity instead of selecting people with high and 
low scores. Extreme-groups designs are common in personality and social psychology, in part 
because of the belief that they enhance statistical power. But one drawback, among others 
(Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, & Nicewander, 2005), is that measurement error is often higher 
at a trait’s extremes, so any gain in power must be weighed against a loss of measurement 
precision. For the CEI-II, it is clear that the extreme values are measured less accurately. As a 
result, researchers who select people with high and low CEI-II scores are selecting the 




There are several limitations in this series of studies that require mention. The reliance on cross-
sectional assessment strategies and college student samples raise questions about the 
generalizability of findings. We are hopeful because the initial CEI continues to exhibit 
acceptable psychometric properties in adolescent (e.g., Kashdan & Yuen, 2007) and community 
samples (e.g., [Almeida et al., 2008] and [Harvey et al., 2009]) from various countries outside 
the United States. The most serious caveat is that these studies lacked outcome variables to fully 
evaluate whether people scoring higher on the CEI-II are in fact more curious, exploratory, and 
better able to cope with the anxiety of novel, complex, and uncertain situations. In addition, most 
of the findings were circumscribed to the validity of the stretching dimension of the CEI-II with 
less information on the validity of the embracing dimension. Although there is preliminary 
evidence for the validity of the embracing subscale, there is reason to be tentative about these 
findings. Of the correlations tested, only two outcome variables (mindful awareness and 
extraversion) were more strongly related to embracing compared with stretching. This pattern of 
correlations might be capitalizing on chance. After all, other constructs related to extraversion in 
our studies such as positive affect showed stronger relations with the stretching subscale. Based 
on the presented data, it remains to be seen how much the embracing items add to our 
operationalization of curiosity. However, we can discuss unpublished data that addresses both of 
these concerns: an appropriate criterion measure to evaluate the CEI-II and the particular utility 
of the embracing items. 
 
In an experimental study, we tested whether being curious, and in particular embracing 
uncertainty, would lead to non-defensive, exploratory reactions when confronted with 
information that can threaten a person’s cultural worldview (Kashdan, Afram, & Brown, 
unpublished manuscript). Using a terror management theory paradigm where people are 
reminded of their own mortality (methodology from Study 2 of Goldenberg et al., 2001), 
participants were then asked to read and evaluate the writer of one of two essays. In the personal 
threat condition, participants read an essay that described humans as slightly more intelligent 
than other animals but otherwise no different from animals in any meaningful way (humans as 
animal). In the control condition, participants read an essay that described humans as having 
characteristics such as the capacity for language and morality that made them highly unique from 
other animals (humans as unique). We hypothesized that curious people would be open to the 
―personally threatening‖ information, responding in an open and receptive manner. As expected, 
people scoring higher on the embracing subscale of the CEI-II showed more positive ratings of 
the essay writer, regardless of being reminded of their mortality or the type of essay being read; a 
similar but smaller main effect was found for the CEI-II total score. Interestingly, we also found 
evidence of construct specificity from mindful awareness as measured by the MAAS (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003) with a curiosity × mindful awareness interaction on likability of essay writer. 
 
Essentially, if you are mindfully aware but not curious, you show a strong negative reaction to 
the threatening essay that humans are just another animal. Mindful awareness without curiosity 
was shown to be relatively inert and impotent without an open and curious attitude as they are 
paying attention in the present moment. This fits with theory suggesting that the ability to self-
regulate attention and a curious orientation toward what is being attended are interlocking 
components that together comprise mindfulness (e.g., Bishop et al., 2004). This is the first study 
to test the synergistic relation between these ingredients of mindfulness. These data provide a 
useful criterion to show that the CEI-II taps curiosity and provide additional justification for the 
validity and clinical utility of the embracing subscale. The results are preliminary but we hope 
that other research teams beyond our own continue to explore this important strength of character 
and discrete positive emotional-motivational system ([Fredrickson, 1998], [Izard, 1977], 
[Kashdan, 2009] and [Panksepp, 1998]). 
 
Given that the CEI-II was designed to measure individual differences in broad dimensions of 
curiosity, an important direction of future research will be modifying and adapting the items to 
fit particular domains of interest. This includes curiosity in school, work, relationships, or any 
other activity or context. Further study of trait curiosity is needed in experimental situations 
where novelty, uncertainty, and challenges are manipulated. Longitudinal studies examining the 
effects of curiosity could provide valuable information regarding the stability of curiosity across 
time as well as the mechanisms by which curiosity promotes positive psychological functioning. 
Also, studies are needed in naturalistic environments, via experience and behavior sampling 
approaches, to better understand the implications of higher trait curiosity on being a productive, 
healthy, functional member of society. Prior work suggests that curiosity offers benefits that are 
equal to or greater than other widely touted psychological strengths (e.g., Peterson et al., 2007) 
and elements of well-being (e.g., Kashdan & Yuen, 2007). Upon redressing problems associated 
with the original CEI, we hope that researchers focus more on this neglected, poorly understood, 
and fundamental aspect of human behavior. 
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Appendix A. The curiosity and exploration inventory-II 
1. I actively seek as much information as I can in new situations.  
2. I am the type of person who really enjoys the uncertainty of everyday life. 
3. I am at my best when doing something that is complex or challenging. 
4. Everywhere I go, I am out looking for new things or experiences. 
5. I view challenging situations as an opportunity to grow and learn. 
6. I like to do things that are a little frightening. 
7. I am always looking for experiences that challenge how I think about myself and the world. 
8. I prefer jobs that are excitingly unpredictable. 
9. I frequently seek out opportunities to challenge myself and grow as a person. 
10. I am the kind of person who embraces unfamiliar people, events, and places. 
Instructions: rate the statements below for how accurately they reflect the way you generally feel 
and behave. Do not rate what you think you should do, or wish you do, or things you no longer 
do. Please be as honest as possible. 
Items 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 reflect stretching. 
Items 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 reflect embracing. Items are anchored on the following scale: 1= very 




1 While our IRT analyses focus on the measurement of curiosity with the CEI-II, the general 
points should apply to other states and traits that are obviously socially desirable. This is 
particularly relevant to the current explosion of self-report measures of well-being (e.g., 
happiness and meaning in life), character strengths (e.g., gratitude and emotional intelligence), 
and self-regulatory processes (e.g., savoring and mindfulness).  
 
